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Abstract 
 
We contribute to the extensive literature on the relationship between earnings announcements 
and market reactions by investigating the European insurance sector, which presents a wide 
difference in transparency between quarterly and semi-annual/annual reports. We design an 
event-study analysis comprising over 900 events in the period 2009-2016, testing if investors 
react differently to the two subsets of reports. We find that quarterly reports result in signals on 
stock prices’ limited to few trading days, whereas semi-annual and annual reports produce bigger 
and more persistent impacts. Instead, we do not find evidence of differences impacting trading 
volumes. Our results are supportive of the recent EU decision to remove the obligation to publish 
quarterly reports to avoid short-termism and suggest that costs are greater than benefits for 
companies considering to adopt voluntary quarterly reports. 
 
Keywords: Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift, Stock Prices, Volume Trading, Insurance, Event 
Study 
 
 
 
1. Introduction and Motivation 
 
Academics, regulators and practitioners have long been debating about earnings 
announcements’ influence on investors’ decisions. Results, after investigating different markets, 
sectors, companies, time-spans and through alternative methodologies, are still inconclusive. 
The relationship between firms, their reporting, investors’ perception and their reaction is 
particularly complex. On one side, the quality of information flows lowers information asymmetries 
and improves firms’ evaluation through a lower cost of capital. This supports, in particular, 
markets’ demand for the enhanced and timely dissemination of financial information.  
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However, producing and managing disclosures bears costs especially for firms: this could 
represent an entry barrier to markets requiring frequent reporting. Moreover, the data required 
might be disproportionate or misleading concerning investors’ needs. Finally, frequent information 
could promote short-termism, adding volatility and reducing long-term benefits on the cost of 
capital. 
Recently, a comprehensive report joining the academic, regulatory and operational 
perspectives on the UK concluded that short-termism is a concern and is mainly caused by “the 
decline of trust and the misalignment of incentives throughout the equity investment chain” (Kay 
2012, p. 9). Among the recommendations of this study, a call for a reduction in the frequency of 
reporting and in relying on performance and risk metrics is worth mentioning. 
In the light of this debate, the European Union recently removed the obligation for 
quarterly financial reporting of listed entities, allowing exchanges and Member countries to 
reconsider their advantages and disadvantages regarding transparency, efficiency and stability 
of financial markets. 
In the meantime, the European insurance sector is experiencing an outstanding amount 
of reporting and regulatory changes. On one side, insurers’ reporting increasingly includes 
disclosures in the supervisory perspective (lately, Solvency 2). On the other side, the IAS/IFRS 
framework proved a source of accounting mismatch for insurers, between fair valued financial 
assets and (mainly) cost-based technical provisions. 
Insurers, more than other firms, present particularly dense and complex reporting that 
could exacerbate the negative externalities of disclosures. Within this stream, this study examines 
how interim reports influence investors for listed European companies included in the STOXX 
Europe 600 Insurance Index, for the period 2009-2016 and with an event-study methodology. 
We aim at investigating if and how investors react to insurers’ earnings announcements. 
Our results can also provide suggestions to insurers’ management in weighting pros and cons of 
quarterly reporting. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and 
presents our hypothesis, Section 3 describes out data and methodology, Section 4 discusses our 
findings, and Section 5 concludes with our final remarks and suggestions for future research. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
Literature that investigates the role of firms’ disclosures is rich, in the accounting as well as in the 
corporate finance and corporate governance fields. Seminal work, dating back to 1920s and 
1930s, share the view that more disclosure is beneficial. However, as the issues of asymmetric 
information emerged as a research area, theoretical and empirical studies began to disentangle 
the complexities of disclosures within the principal-agent framework in firms. The idea that an 
increase in disclosures reduces the non-diversifiable risk premium applied to discount firms’ future 
cash flows is still valid, but research is not conclusive yet. 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) provide the first contribution modeling the positive impact 
of disclosures on the cost of capital. Subsequently, several papers added empirical evidence on 
the role played by various features of disclosures, with different approaches and, at least partially, 
mixed results. However, older contributions did not lose their validity: Landsman and Maydew 
(2002) report how over time (1972-1998) the information content of quarterly earnings 
announcements increased, also supporting the relevance of the specific measures proposed by 
Beaver (1968). 
Voluntary disclosures reduce information asymmetries and improve the liquidity of equity 
markets (Welker, 1995), returns, attention to the firm and institutional ownership (Healy et al. 
1999), bid-ask spreads and trading volumes of stocks (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). Market 
reactions in terms of trading volumes are also explainable as a measure of opinion divergence 
(Garfinkel and Sokobin, 2006). An increased frequency of reporting reduces information 
asymmetry and the cost of equity, with no evidence of differences between mandatory and 
voluntary disclosures (Fu et al. 2012), but a positive link between business diversifications and 
voluntary segment disclosure are reported for Australia in Chan and Watson (2011). 
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The opacity of reporting, instead, is empirically associated with a higher cost of capital 
and less trading in stocks (Bhattacharya et al. 2003; despite differences in methodology, also in 
Francis et al. 2005; and Barth et al. 2013). 
The impact on the cost of capital is less clear. It is found positive only for firms that receive 
a low level of analyst attention (Botosan, 1997) and the effects are larger if “accounting based” 
measures of earnings are considered instead of “market-based” ones (Francis et al. 2004). 
A positive role of disclosures is also reported on debt capital (Sengupta, 1998; Francis et 
al. 2005), however evidencing how this effect is present in particular for riskier firms. Moreover, 
debtors appear ready to increase the cost of their debt capital in exchange for more accounting 
flexibility that avoids covenant violations and costs of reporting duplications (Beatty et al. 2002). 
On short-termism, Roe (2014) provides a comprehensive assessment of reasons against 
it, including its limited systemic impact, the inconclusiveness of findings so far, the role played by 
short-termed managers’ compensation, and the limited evidence of a change in institutional 
investors’ holding period. On the side of managers, a large number of CFOs would trade-off 
investment projects with positive present values if negative impacts would be produced on 
quarterly performance (Graham et al. 2005). No systematic post-earnings announcement drift to 
semi-annual reports is found in the Belgian stock market (Van Huffel et al. 1996). The information 
content of accounting figures and their impact on intraday trading leads to consistent reactions to 
good/bad news, but abnormal returns disappear after 15 minutes, and increases in trading 
volumes persist after prices converge to equilibrium (Louhichi, 2008). Contrasting results are 
achieved by other scholars. 
More disclosures attract investors focused on short-termism that increases stocks’ 
volatility (Bushee and Noe, 2000) and, in the case of seasoned equity offerings, “hype” the stocks 
and leads to persistent following negative returns (Lang and Lundholm, 2000). Despite the fact 
that disclosures, in general, improve the cost of capital, the opposite occurs for quarterly reporting 
due to the increase in volatility they seem to produce (Botosan and Plumlee, 2002). Investigating 
differences between voluntary and mandatory interim reports, there is little evidence that 
timeliness of reporting is enhanced by requirements of more frequent disclosures (Butler et al. 
2007) and, more importantly, mandatory increases in frequency are found in the US to lead to a 
reduction in firms’ investments (Kraft et al. 2017). A trade-off model on reporting frequency finds 
benefits regarding limiting negative net present value projects but at the same time increasing 
managers’ short-termism (Gigler et al. 2014). Similarly, modelling leads to conclude that greater 
disclosures produce significant indirect costs, by aggravating agency issues, by increasing 
executive compensation and without adding value to firms (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012). The 
different information content of interim reporting leads to differences in investors’ reaction 
triggered by inhomogeneous reports (Gajewski and Quéré, 2001). More recently, reactions to 
earnings announcements are found influenced mainly by market uncertainty and sentiment (Bird 
et al. 2014), the quality of earnings (Ecker et al. 2006) yet behavioral implications are still open to 
investigation (Luo, 2014). 
Despite the abundant literature evidenced above, few studies focus on the insurance 
sector and are concentrated in the non-life area. Foster (1975) provides a seminal role in this 
field, empirically rejecting the general assumption that statutory measures of underwriting 
earnings in the life and health insurance sector adversely affect their stock prices. More recently, 
the insurance industry experienced analysts’ earnings forecasts superior to random walk models, 
and a positive effect of fair value reporting on the accuracy of forecasts, especially for life insurers 
(Fan et al. 2006). 
In the property and casualty segment, reporting is affected by bias in the measure of 
claim provisions (Petroni, 1992), despite a less clear relationship between positive or negative 
earnings and the incentive to manage provisions (Beaver et al. 2003). Nonetheless, investors use 
the information content of disclosed estimation errors in earnings of property and casualty insurers 
to judge earnings’ quality (Anthony and Petroni, 1997). Investors anticipate the incentive to 
manage earnings and judge their quality in the non-life sector (Christensen et al. 1999) and use 
earnings disclosures arising from major catastrophes to reduce the uncertainty they face 
(Christensen et al. 2002). Moreover, greater market reactions are associated with non-life larger 
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and more widely followed firms (Christensen et al. 2004) and are influenced by uncertainty among 
analysts (Christensen et al. 2005). 
On the opaqueness of insurers, Pottier and Sommer (2006) investigate the features that 
complicate the evaluation in this industry; these can be summarized in a smaller size, errors in 
provisioning, less use of reinsurance, more investment in stocks or low-grade bonds and more 
geographical diversification. More opaque business lines, measured by underwriting liabilities, 
generate costs for property and casualty insurers through adverse selection on their stock prices 
(Zhang et al. 2009). Finally, more informative earnings announcements are associated with 
smaller insurers, those with higher residuals in daily stock returns, companies less widely followed 
by analysts, property and casualty insurers with lower asset transparency, and life and health 
insurers with more use of reinsurance (Cotei et al. 2012). 
Consistently with the previous literature and considering the special case of insurers, we 
design an event-study to test the following hypothesis. 
 
H1a: Quarterly reports provide less significant and less persistent effects on prices than 
semi-annual and annual reports. 
H1b: Quarterly reports provide less significant and less persistent impacts on volumes 
than semi-annual and annual reports. 
 
Due to the different depth and breadth of quarterly reports, concerning audited and more 
regulated semi-annual and annual reports, we expect market reactions to be more affected by 
short-termism. Due to the more limited informative content of quarterly reports, we expect 
investors to focus more on reported and forecasted earnings and also to appraise the higher 
opacity of related figures. We are interested in measuring effects both as abnormal returns and 
as a cumulative abnormal return. 
Moreover, we expect that reactions are not necessarily only captured by abnormal returns 
in prices, but also by more or less persistent increases in trading volumes around earnings 
announcements. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
To test our hypothesis, our research design requires the application of the event study 
methodology, to link the market signal of earnings announcements to the relative performance of 
each company’s stock. 
More specifically, if an abnormal reaction to this information is observed regarding stock 
prices or trading volumes, then it can be concluded that earnings announcements provide 
valuable news to market participants. In terms of the econometric approach that we adopted, we 
refer to Binder (1998), Campbell et al. (1997) and Corrado (2011) for a detailed description. 
We collect market and accounting data on European listed insurers through Bloomberg. 
In particular, we investigate a sample of all 34 firms included in the STOXX Europe 600 Insurance 
Index as of April 2017. Table 1 reports the names of these constituents and the country of origin, 
whereas Table 2 illustrates the relative weight of different countries on the index. 
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Table 1. List of constituents of the STOXX Europe 600 Insurance index 
as of April 2017 
Company Country Symbol 
ADMIRAL GRP United Kingdom ADM LN Equity 
AEGON Netherlands AGN NA Equity 
AGEAS Belgium AGS BB Equity 
ALLIANZ Germany ALV GY Equity 
ASSICURAZIONI GENERALI Italy G IM Equity 
AVIVA United Kingdom AV/ LN Equity 
AXA France CS FP Equity 
BALOISE Switzerland BALN VX Equity 
BEAZLEY United Kingdom BEZ LN Equity 
CNP ASSURANCES France CNP FP Equity 
DIRECT LINE INSURANCE GROUP United Kingdom DLG LN Equity 
GJENSIDIGE FORSIKRING Norway GJF NO Equity 
HANNOVER RUECK Germany HNR1 GY Equity 
HELVETIA HLDG Switzerland HELN SW Equity 
HISCOX United Kingdom HSX LN Equity 
LEGAL & GENERAL GRP United Kingdom LGEN LN Equity 
MAPFRE Spain MAP SM Equity 
MUENCHENER RUECK Germany MUV2 GY Equity 
NN GROUP Netherlands NN NA Equity 
OLD MUTUAL United Kingdom OML LN Equity 
PHOENIX GROUP HDG. United Kingdom PHNX LN Equity 
POSTE ITALIANE Italy PST IM Equity 
PRUDENTIAL United Kingdom PRU LN Equity 
RSA INSURANCE GRP United Kingdom RSA LN Equity 
SAMPO Finland SAMPO FH Equity 
SCOR France SCR FP Equity 
ST.JAMES'S PLACE CAPITAL United Kingdom STJ LN Equity 
STANDARD LIFE United Kingdom SL/ LN Equity 
STOREBRAND Norway STB NO Equity 
SWISS LIFE HLDG Switzerland SLHN VX Equity 
SWISS REINSURANCE COMPANY Switzerland SREN VX Equity 
TRYG Denmark TRYG DC Equity 
UNIPOLSAI Italy UNI IM Equity 
ZURICH INSURANCE GROUP Switzerland ZURN VX Equity 
Note: This table presents the insurers investigated by our study and resulting from their current inclusion in 
the STOXX Europe 600 Insurance Index. The composition of the index varies across the period considered 
in our analysis (2009-2016) and is referred to April 2017. The table also reports each company’s symbol in 
Bloomberg that represents the main source of our market data. 
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Table 2. Country weights and companies in the STOXX Europe 600 Insurance Index 
(April 2017) 
Country Weight (%) Companies 
United Kingdom 30.5 12 
Germany 23.4 3 
Switzerland 17.0 5 
France 12.3 3 
Italy 5.0 3 
Finland 4.4 1 
Netherlands 3.8 2 
Belgium 1.5 1 
Norway 1.1 2 
Spain 0.8 1 
Denmark 0.2 1 
Total 100.0 34 
Note: This table presents the weight in percentage of each country in the STOXX Europe 600 Insurance 
index as of April 2017, based on the free float market cap, as well as the number of companies it represents. 
Source: Stoxx (2017) 
  
 
In our reference sample, as it is frequently the case for cross-country indexes, some 
countries are over-represented, and others are under-represented, leading to concerns about the 
ability of measures to exclude currency effects or juridical differences. We do not feel that this is 
biasing our results significantly since we rely on data that is expressed in the same third-country 
currency (USD); moreover, accounting frameworks and regulation are similar or can be 
considered equivalent in a juridical sense (for instance, in the case of Switzerland). 
Quarterly earnings announcements dates are extracted from Bloomberg. However, due 
to the related dataset being incomplete, we also collected earnings announcement dates from 
company’s websites. This collection of data allowed us to cross-check the correctness of this 
information for all firms. In the following pages, we will refer to Q1 and to Q3 to indicate first and 
third quarter reports, to Q2 for semi-annual reports and to Q4 for annual reports. Also, daily data 
regarding closing prices and trading volumes are collected from Bloomberg dataset. 
The final database covers the period ranging from March 2009 to March 2017. We 
decided to start our analysis in 2009 for two reasons. On one side, information on earnings 
announcements before this date, when missing in Bloomberg’s dataset, are no longer present in 
most websites of firms. On the other hand, earnings and market reactions before that date could 
be exposed to an excessive impact of the aftermath of the financial crisis, especially on equity 
instruments of financial institutions as in our case. This fact could lead to related signals around 
earnings announcement dates to overreact if compared to a normalized market environment. 
We, therefore, analyze a sample including a total of 937 earnings announcements. Table 
3 shows the number of event dates per year, while Table 4 shows the average delay between 
two contiguous announcements and its standard deviation. 
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Table 3. Number of sampled earnings announcements per year 
Year Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total 
2009 25 29 25 30 109 
2010 26 29 24 31 110 
2011 26 31 27 31 115 
2012 27 31 28 32 118 
2013 28 32 28 32 120 
2014 28 33 29 33 123 
2015 28 33 29 34 124 
2016 25 34 25 34 118 
Total 213 252 215 257 937 
Note: This table presents the size of our sample in terms of the number of earnings announcements per 
year and per timing of the specific report. Q1 refers to first-quarter reports, Q2 to semi-annual reports, Q3 
for third-quarter reports and Q4 to annual reports. 
Source: Authors’ data processing. 
 
Table 4. Time interval between earnings announcements 
Report Mean St. dev. 
Q1 to Q2 63 7 
Q2 to Q3 67 9 
Q3 to Q4 78 11 
Q4 to Q1 48 12 
Note: This table presents the time interval across our sample between subsequent reports, in terms of cross-
year and cross-firm mean and standard deviation of calendar days. Q1 refers to first-quarter reports, Q2 to 
semi-annual reports, Q3 for third-quarter reports and Q4 to annual reports. 
Source: Authors’ data processing. 
 
 
It can be noted that annual reports, requiring both a larger breadth and depth of 
information to be provided to investors, present a wider time interval from the previous report than 
it is the case for other quarters. Moreover, the annual report is frequently published very close to 
first quarter results, as shown in the shorter time interval between Q4 and Q1. This could lead to 
consequences in terms of market signals considering that for a longer period (Q3 to Q4) markets 
do not have information on companies’ earnings, whereas in a shorter window (Q4 to Q1) the 
information is provided with greater frequency, yet with a very different depth. 
In line with Fama et al. (1969) and Gajewski and Quéré (2001), we use continuously 
compounded returns and examine multi-day windows of 20 trading days centered on the event 
day. This, in order to account for both potential imprecision about earnings announcement date 
(for instance, some information could be distributed earlier than the official release date) and the 
uncertainty related to the speed of the event’s effect on security prices (for example, the 
announcement could be close to other market-wide major events that influence investors’ 
reaction). 
To capture the effect of the event on stock i at time t, the normal return is defined in terms 
of the market model (Sharpe, 1964); thus the abnormal return is given by: 
 
 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡) (1) 
 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡  represents the observed return for security i at time t and 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the market index return 
at the same time, and ?̂?𝑖 and ?̂?𝑖  are ordinary least square estimates of market model parameters 
based on a 250 days windows between -250 days and -21 days before the earnings 
announcement day (t = 0) , excluding the announcements windows of previous quarters. 
The cumulative abnormal return for stock i over the event window of days 𝑡1 through 𝑡2 is 
defined as 
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 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = ∑ 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
 (2) 
 
and can be used to provide some insights about how the information conveyed into earnings 
announcements is absorbed in subsequent days. 
We consider three commonly used parametric statistical tests from the literature in our 
analysis. The first statistic is obtained by dividing the mean abnormal return by the cross-sectional 
standard deviation: 
 
 𝑇𝑡 =
?̅?𝑡
𝜎𝑡
√𝑁
⁄
 (3) 
 
 
where:  
 
 ?̅?𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1  (4) 
 
and:  
 
 𝜎𝑡=√
1
𝑁−1
∑ (𝑢𝑖𝑡−𝑢𝑡)
2𝑁
𝑖=1 . (5) 
 
To test if mean abnormal returns are significantly different from zero, the null hypothesis 
?̅?𝑡 = 0 is tested. 
The second is a variant of the Patell (1976) Z-test, the so-called standardized cross-
sectional test (Boehmer et al. 1991), defined as follows: 
 
 𝑍𝑡 =
𝑁−1 2⁄ ∑ 𝑢𝑖𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑡⁄
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝜎𝑡
 (6) 
 
where 𝑠𝑖𝑡 is defined as follows: 
 
 𝑠𝑖𝑡 = √(
1
𝑀𝑖−2
∑ 𝑢𝑖𝑘2
−21
𝑘=−270 ) [1 +
1
𝑀𝑖
+
(𝑅𝑚𝑡−?̅?𝑚,𝑒𝑠𝑡)
2
∑ (𝑅𝑚𝑘−?̅?𝑚,𝑒𝑠𝑡)
2−21
𝑘=−270
] (7) 
 
𝑀𝑖  is the number of non-missing estimation period returns for stock i and ?̅?𝑚,𝑒𝑠𝑡  is the mean 
daily market index return in the estimation period. 
In this case, the null hypothesis to be tested is 𝑁−1 2⁄ ∑ 𝑢𝑖𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑡⁄
𝑁
𝑖=1 = 0. 
These two test statistics will also be used to study the impact of earnings announcements 
on daily trading volumes, computed as the natural logarithm of the product of prices and traded 
quantities of each day. 
For multi-day windows involving cumulative abnormal returns, we follow the suggestions 
of Campbell et al. (2010) and incorporate in the aforementioned test of Patell a correction for the 
serial dependence in successive prediction errors that are based on the same parameter 
estimates. The procedure is based on the following two steps. First, the standardized cumulative 
abnormal return is calculated as: 
 
 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡1, 𝑡2) =
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡1,𝑡2)
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡1,𝑡2)
 (8) 
 
where [t1, t2] is an interval in the event window and 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡1,𝑡2) denotes the corrected standard 
deviation accordingly to the following formula: 
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 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡1,𝑡2) = √(
1
𝑀𝑖−2
∑ 𝑢𝑖𝑘2
−21
𝑘=−270 ) 𝑊𝑖 [1 +
𝑊𝑖
𝑀𝑖
+
(𝑅𝑚𝑡−𝑊𝑖?̅?𝑚,𝑒𝑠𝑡)
2
∑ (𝑅𝑚𝑘−?̅?𝑚,𝑒𝑠𝑡)
2−21
𝑘=−270
] (9) 
 
with 𝑊𝑖 being the number of non-missing daily returns for stock i in the event window. 
Successively, the standardized cross-sectional statistic for the interval [t1, t2] is given by 
 
 𝑍𝑡 =
𝑁−1 2⁄ ∑ 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡1,𝑡2)
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝜎𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅
 (10) 
 
where 𝜎𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅 is defined as follows: 
 
 𝜎𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅 = √
1
𝑁−1
∑ (𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡1, 𝑡2) −
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗(𝑡1, 𝑡2)
𝑁
𝑗=1 )
2
.𝑁𝑖=1  (11) 
 
 
4. Discussion of Findings 
 
According to the literature and our methodological strategy, we started to investigate abnormal 
returns around earnings announcements between two datasets: quarterly announcements (first 
and third quarter – Q1 and Q3) and semi-annual and annual reports (Q2 and Q4). 
This comparison is consistent with our expectation that more opaque and less detailed 
announcements (Q1 and Q3) could lead to a lower level of reaction between investors. Moreover, 
we are interested in comparing both abnormal returns and abnormal volumes. 
 
Table 5. Abnormal returns around quarterly announcements 
Day 
Q1-Q3 Q2-Q4 
AR T p-value AR T p-value 
-4 0.0003 1.6164 0.1060 0.0007 3.9577 0.0001*** 
-3 -0.0008 -4.1639 0.0000*** 0.0008 5.0232 0.0000*** 
-2 0.0011 4.5628 0.0000*** 0.0011 6.3444 0.0000*** 
-1 0.0008 3.5970 0.0003*** 0.0006 3.6288 0.0003*** 
0 0.0001 0.1717 0.8637 0.0035 6.4249 0.0000*** 
1 -0.0020 -7.0824 0.0000*** 0.0026 10.8494 0.0000*** 
2 -0.0004 -1.7173 0.0859 0.0010 4.3339 0.0000*** 
3 -0.0002 -1.0726 0.2835 -0.0007 -4.1299 0.0000*** 
Wilcoxon signed rank test 
R+ R- z-value p-value 
221 682 -2.8821 0.004*** 
Note: This table presents the result for the abnormal returns in the days surrounding earnings 
announcement dates, as well as the T-statistic and its p-value. Q1-Q3 refers to quarterly reports, Q2-Q4 to 
semi-annual and annual reports. The table includes the Wilcoxon signed rank test between Q1-Q3 and Q2-
Q4, including the Z-statistic and its p-value. Significance codes: *** at the 1% level. 
 
Table 5 presents the findings of our first comparison. We find that abnormal returns are 
highly significant (at the 1% level) for the whole event window that we consider (i.e. 4 days earlier 
to 3 days following announcements) only in the case of semi-annual and annual reports. 
Moreover, these returns are positive until the last day in the event window and tend to increase 
approaching the event date and to furtherly grow significantly from day [0] to day [+2]. In the case 
of quarterly reports, the significance is high only partially, from day [-3] to day [-1] and in day [+1], 
but lacks any statistical relevance in the other days. Moreover, abnormal returns are only partially 
positive (especially, they become negative after the announcement date) and express lower 
levels and a decreasing trend. 
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In order to confirm that the two sets of abnormal returns are statistically different, and 
being the two samples not normally distributed, we carry the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed 
rank test. We find strong evidence, at the 1% level, that the two samples differ in their mean ranks. 
To furtherly extend these considerations, we continued our analysis by testing cumulative 
abnormal returns around quarterly announcements in a larger event window (i.e. [-20, +20]) in 
the two subsets. Firstly, we plotted the distribution of results to appraise graphically the relevant 
differences in the two different sets of earnings announcements: results are provided in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Cumulative abnormal returns around the quarterly announcements 
Note: This figure plots the signal attributable to earnings announcements, in terms of cumulative abnormal 
returns, in the event-window [-20;+20]. The comparison provided is between Q1-Q3 (quarterly reports) and 
Q2-Q4 reports (semi-annual and annual reports). 
 
It seems that previous results on abnormal returns are confirmed: the two distributions 
differ significantly especially from 13 days before the announcement date and keep a different 
path afterwards. The signal is weaker for Q1 and Q3 reports and concentrated very close to the 
announcement date. Instead, the effect has a greater magnitude for Q2 and Q4 reports and also 
shows a longer persistence after the announcement date. 
To confirm these more intuitive findings, we tested cumulative abnormal returns also 
econometrically and in different event windows with different sizes (from 5 days to 2 days), around 
or before the announcement date. Results are provided in Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Cumulative abnormal returns around earnings announcements 
Event 
window 
Q1-Q3 Q2-Q4 
CAR Z p-value CAR Z p-value 
[-3, -1] 0.0006 1.5862 0.1127 0.0026 32.7392 0.0000*** 
[-3, +1] 0.0014 1.9391 0.0525 0.0067 31.5945 0.0000*** 
[-2, -1] 0.0002 0.4116 0.6806 0.0019 28.8209 0.0000*** 
[-2, +1] 0.0011 1.3673 0.1715 0.0060 28.8061 0.0000*** 
[-1, +1] 0.0019 9.1111 0.0000*** 0.0051 31.7797 0.0000*** 
[-1, 0] -0.0008 0.6508 0.5151 0.0002 45.5698 0.0000*** 
[0, +1] 0.0009 2.5434 0.0110** 0.0041 30.7197 0.0000*** 
Note: This table presents the result for the cumulative abnormal returns in different event windows 
surrounding earnings announcement dates, as well as the Z-statistic and its p-value. Q1-Q3 refers to 
quarterly reports, Q2-Q4 to semi-annual and annual reports. Significance codes: *** at the 1% level, ** at 
the 5% level. 
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The findings are confirmed. Semi-annual and annual reports show high significance in 
cumulative abnormal returns in all windows (at the 1% level). Moreover, the level of cumulative 
abnormal returns is consistently higher when windows include the event date and the following 
days. In the case of quarterly reports, the same significance is obtained only for the event window 
[-1, +1], with a weaker significance in the case of the [0, +1] window (at the 5% level). Moreover, 
the level of cumulative abnormal returns is significantly lower, in particular where we can compare 
results with statistical significance. 
Jointly, findings on abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns confirm our first 
hypothesis (H1a): quarterly reports provide less significant and less persistent effects on prices 
than semi-annual and annual reports. We argue that this result could be explained by the different 
breadth and depth of information provided by the two groups of reports. Q1 and Q3 reports are 
not able to produce material impacts on stock prices (small and not statistically significant 
cumulative abnormal returns) and effects are not persistent. Q2 and Q4, instead, seem to offer 
material contents to assess the fundamentals of the reporting entity that will be important in a 
longer term. 
At this point, it could be argued that prices alone do not express entirely the capability of 
information to attract investors. This may happen because, if there are conflicting interpretations 
of the quantity or quality of earnings announced, price changes could be limited, but this does not 
mean that a reaction on investors was stimulated. For this reason, we extend our analysis to 
capture abnormal effects on trading volumes of stocks, rather than prices. We compute trading 
volumes as the natural logarithm of the product of prices and traded quantities of each day. 
Again, as a first step, we plot the two distributions of trading volumes in the event window [-20, 
+20]. Results are provided in Figure 2, whereas Table 7 summarizes the outcome of the Wilcoxon 
signed rank test.  
Results confirm that the two distributions are not statistically different. Therefore, we reject 
our second hypothesis (H1b): the impact on trading volumes of Q1 and Q3 reports is not 
significantly different from Q2, and Q4 reports. A potential explanation, which we are not able to 
test empirically with our data, is that the two contrasting results on stock prices and trading 
volumes could depend on the type of investors that are attracted by the two different subsets of 
reports. In other terms, it is possible to argue that when information is poorer in terms of quality 
and quantity (Q1 and Q3) the increase in trading volumes could be the result of high-frequency 
trading systems or equivalent strategies. Such investors should be interested more in a quick 
response to the few information available (in particular, “surprise” of the announcement 
concerning expectations) and to obtain returns from large volumes entering and exiting the stock 
market even if price changes are small. This evidence is in contrast with the case of more 
informative reports that could convey more signals regarding the long-term quality of earnings 
announced, that attract a greater share of more patient investors interested in companies’ 
fundamentals. This could explain at the same time why trading volumes do not differ between Q1-
Q3 and Q2-Q4 reports, but so do abnormal returns and their persistence. 
 
Table 7. Wilcoxon signed rank test on abnormal trading volumes around earnings 
announcement dates 
Wilcoxon signed rank test 
R+ R- z-value p-value 
385 476 -0.5896 0.5555 
 
Note: This table provides the Wilcoxon signed rank test between Q1-Q3 (quarterly reports) and Q2-Q4 
(semi-annual and annual reports) in terms of abnormal trading volumes, calculated as the natural logarithm 
of the product of each day reference price and related trading quantities, including the Z-statistic and its p-
value. 
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Figure 2. Abnormal trading volumes around earnings announcement dates 
Note: This figure plots the signal attributable to earnings announcements, in terms of cumulative abnormal 
volumes calculated as the natural logarithm of each day’s reference price and related traded quantities, in 
the event-window [-20;+20]. The comparison provided is between Q1-Q3 (quarterly reports) and Q2-Q4 
reports (semi-annual and annual reports).  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
After decades of research in the accounting, corporate finance and governance areas trying to 
link earnings announcements and market reaction, theoretical and empirical evidence are still 
nonconclusive. 
On one side frequency and quality of company reporting, while reducing information 
asymmetries with investors, should provide benefits in terms of market liquidity and efficiency, as 
well as a reduction in volatility that leads to a reduced cost of capital for firms. On the other hand, 
reporting is costly for firms to produce and for investors to analyze, potentially leading to adverse 
incentives on earnings management, misleading information or increased short-termism of 
managers’ and investors’ decisions. 
In the light of this debate, the EU recently waived the previous requirement on listed 
entities to publish quarterly reports, leaving the decision on Member countries or, in the absence 
of a binding choice, to each firm. 
The insurance sector, in this regard, provides an ideal setting to test market reactions to 
firm announcements that did not receive a fair attention so far in the literature. First of all, a specific 
reference to this sector is important due to the role played by these institutions in financial and 
insurance markets as institutional investors and risk absorbers. Then, insurance in Europe was 
recently subject to a growing attention to enhanced and converging solvency requirements (lately, 
Solvency 2) and to the application of both national GAAP and IAS/IFRS that are the result of 
different accounting frameworks and did not solve the opacity issue due to a mismatching 
measurement of assets, between a cost-based and a fair valuation, and liabilities, still widely 
diverging at the national and company level. Finally, this industry suffers more than others from 
the different qualitative contents of more structured, supervised and audited filings (semi-annual 
and annual reports), compared to more opaque measures of earnings (quarterly reports). 
We contribute to this field by investigating market reaction to different earnings 
announcements for all listed European companies included in the STOXX Europe 600 Insurance 
Index in the period 2009-2016. In particular, we measured if the signal is different in terms of 
abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal volumes around announcement dates, 
hypothesizing that both prices and volumes express a different reaction of markets contingent on 
the kind of published report. 
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Our findings are supportive of our hypothesis for returns. We find that more structured 
reports lead to a greater and, especially, more persistent effect on stock prices. Quarterly reports 
do react, but the signal is weaker and significant only for 3 days before and 1 day after the 
announcement date, and also inverting the sign of the abnormal return. The two types of 
announcements are significantly different in a statistical sense. Similar results are obtained for 
cumulative abnormal returns, with different event windows widely significant for semi-annual and 
annual reports, whereas only shorter windows that include the day after the announcement are 
significant for quarterly reports. 
We do not find evidence of differences between the two sets of reports when we analyze 
traded volumes in monetary terms. In particular, the signal on volumes does not differ significantly 
between quarterly and semi-annual/annual reports. We argue that this could be linked to the 
presence of more short-term trading strategies, including high-frequency trading, in quarterly 
reports where earnings are opaquer, and the analysis of firms’ fundamentals does not provide an 
advantage over a surprise effect on analysts’ expectations. 
Our results are therefore supportive of the EU decision to remove the obligation on 
quarterly reports since they seem to incentivize short-termism. Moreover, our findings should be 
interesting for firms that are considering if quarterly reports should be provided on a voluntary 
base: costs seem to exceed benefits of such decision. 
Suggestions for future research in this area include the assessment of different reactions 
in case of positive or negative announcements, and the measure of the impact of different 
company features on investors’ perception (life, non-life, reinsurance; earnings source and 
quality; exposure to financial markets, etc.). However, further segmentations are likely to be 
constrained on the limited number of insurers that are listed in worldwide equity markets. 
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